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Comments
EXCLUSION OF TENANT FROM POSSESSION

Not infrequently when a person enters into a lease he finds himself excluded
from possession either by the lessor, a person holding under paramount title, or
by one who is a total stranger to the title and is a mere wrongdoer or trespasser.
It is proposed to inquire as to what are his legal rights when placed in such a
situation, other than possible efforts to oust the one in possession.
First, we shall consider whether such exclusion of the lessee gives him any
affirmative right against the lessor for damages. But before considering the

(299)
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various factual situations, it seems desirable to determine what the form or
the nature of such an action would be, assuming that there is such a right of
action.
There have been some decisions to the effect that a failure on the part of
the lessor to see that the premises are open to the lessee at the time named for
the beginning of the term constitutes a breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment.1 This covenant, though often expressed in the lease is, in absence of such
express covenant, implied from the fact that the relationship of landlord and
tenant exists. 2 In opposition to this view however, it has been held in some
cases that, while the lessee is entitled to recover damages for the lessor's refusal to comply with the agreement, he cannot recover for a breach of the implied covenant for quiet enjoyment when he has never been in possession of the
land. 3 The reason for this view seems to be the narrow rule that there can be
no breach of this covenant unless there is an eviction, and here, there being no
antecedent possession by the lessee, technically there can be no eviction.4
Although the courts seldom refuse to grant relief when the lessee has been
excluded, it is often difficult to ascertain what the theory of the relief is. The
courts that follow the strict rule that there can be no breach of the implied covenant for quiet enjoyment unless there has been an eviction, and hold that there
can be no eviction without an antecedent possession, generally allow the lessee to
recover damages from the lessor by holding that, in the lease, there is an implied promise by the lessor to put the lessee into possession. 5 The language of
the court in Thomas v. Groom6 is representative of this tendency. The court
there says, "We are of the opinion, however, that, by virtue of a lease contract,
there is an implied covenant that the demised premises shall be open to entry to
the lessee at the time fixed in the lease for the beginning of the term; and that,

1. McAlester v. Landers, 70 Cal. 79, 11 Pac. 505 (1886); Kammerer v.
U. S. Silica Co., 196 Ill. App. 527 (1915); Riley v. Hale, 158 Mass. 240, 33 N. E.
491 (1893); Gardner v. Keteltas, 3 Hill 330 (N. Y. 1842); Garrison v. Hutton,
118 App. Div. 455, 103 N. Y. Supp. 265 (3d Dep't 1907); Brennan v. Jacobs, 15
Atl. 685 (Pa. 1888); Ft. Terrett Ranch Co. v. Bell, 275 S. W. 81 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1925).
2. Sbe Adrian v. Rabinowitz, 116 N. J.L. 586, 186 Atl. 29 (1936), holding
that where there is an exclusion of the lessee from possession this is a breach
of the express covenant for quiet enjoyment, but that no covenant for quiet enjoyment will be implied from the mere relationship of landlord and tenant.
3. Schwartsman v. Wilmington Stores Co., 32 Del. 362, 123 Atl. 343 (1924);
same case on prior appeal, 32 Del. 7, 117 Atl. 739 (1922) (holding that while
the lessee is entitled to recover damages for f#ilure of the lessor to put him into
possession, he cannot recover for breach of an implied covenant for quiet enjoyment where he never entered into possession of the premises); Stiger v. Monroe,
109 Ga. 457, 34 S.E. 595 (1899) ; Wallis v. Hands, [1893] 2 Ch. 75.
4. Stiger v. Monroe, 109 Ga. 457, 34 S.E. 595 (1899).
5. Rose v. Wynn, 42 Ark. 257 (1883); Thomas v. Croom, 102 Ark. 108,
143 S. W. 88 (1912); L'Hussier v. Zallee, 24 Mo. 13 (1856); Hughes v. Hood,
50 Mo. 350 (1872); Rieger v. Welles, 110 Mo. App. 166. 84 S. W. 1136 (1903);
Brown v. Wall, 186 Mo. App. 150, 171 S. W. 586 (1914); Herpolsheimer v.
Christopher, 76 Neb. 352, 111 N. W. 359 (1906); Sloan v. Hart, 150 N. C. 269, 63
S.E. 1037 (1909); Bloch v. Busch, 160 Tenn. 21, 22 S.W. (2d) 242 (1929).
6. 102 Ark. 108, 143 S.W. 88 (1912).
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if the lessee is prevented from obtaining possession by some one holding the premises, then such covenant is violated, and the lessee is entitled to recover from the
lessor the damages which may be sustained by him."
Whether or not the lessee will be able to recover damages on any of the
above mentioned theories depends on whether he was excluded by the lessor himself; by a person having paramount title; or by an intruder having no right,
such as a holdover tenant or a trespasser. When the lessee is excluded from
possession by one having paramount title, this means that he has not been given
the legal right to possession; while if he is excluded by a previous tenant holding over after the expiration of his term or by any other intruder not lawfully
in possession, he has been given the legal right, but the premises are not actually
open to his entry.
It is well settled that there is contained within a lease, in absence of an
express provision to the contrary, an implied covenant to put the lessee in possession or to have the premises open to possession as against the lessor or
7
someone having paramount title. It seems that, where the lessee is excluded
by one having paramount title, even if he were not entitled to sue on the implied
covenant for quiet enjoyment or an implied covenant to give possession, he
could sue on the implied covenant of power to demise.
In regard to whether the lessee can recover damages from the lessor when
he has been excluded by a wrongdoer, the authorities are in direct conflict. One
line of decisions follows what is referred to as "the American Rule." This group
holds that in the absence of an express provision in the lease, the lessor impliedly
covenants that the lessee shall have the legal right to possession at the beginning
of the term, but that there is no implied covenant to put the lessee in possession
8
as against a wrong-doer or intruder.
There are other jurisdictions which follow what is generally termed as
"the English Rule." These courts hold that the lessor impliediy covenants that
the premises shall be open both legally and actually, to the lessee on the day
9
Consequently, in the jurisdictions
specified for the beginning of the term.

7. Gardner v. Keteltas, 3 Hill 330 (N. Y. 1842); see also Rice v. Biltmore
Apartments Co., 141 Md. 507, 119 Atl. 364 (1922).
8. Gazzolo v. Chambers, 73 Ill. 75 (1874); Rice v. Biltmore Apartments
Co., 141 Md. 507, 119 Atl. 364 (1922), holding in effect that, while a covenant to
protect the tenant against a paramount title or against anyone claiming under
the landlord will be implied, a stranger or a mere trespasser wrongfully in possession. such as a tenant holding over after his term, will not be. But as to
such wrongdoer, it remits the tenant to the assertion and establishment of the
title and right of possession under the lease. Also, in accord: Snider v. Deban,
249 Mass. 59, 144 N. E. 69 (1924); West v. Kitchell, 109 Miss. 328, 68 So. 469
(1915); Pendergast v. Young, 21 N. H. 234 (1850); Gardner v. Keteltas, 3 Hill
330 (N. Y. 1842); United Merchants' Realty and Improv. Co. v. Roth, 193 N. Y.
570, 86 N. E. 544 (1908). See also Hannan v. Dusch, 153 S.E. 824 (Va. App.
1930).
9. King v. Reynolds, 67 Ala. 229 (1880); Thomas v. Croom, 102 Ark. 108,
143 S.W. 88 (1912) ; Morrison v. Weinstein, 151 Ark. 255, 236 S.W. 585 (1921) ;
Miller v. Ready, 59 Ind. App. 195, 108 N. E. 605 (1915); Dilly v. Paynsville
Land Co., 173 Iowa 536, 155 N. W. 971 (1916) ; Mattingly's Ex'r v. Brents, 155
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following this view, where the term of the lessee is to begin in futuro, it is the
duty of the lessor to oust anyone who may then be in possession.
The "English Rule" seems to be the better view, because it is more in accordance with what the actual intention of the parties to the lease probably was.
The "American Rule," though followed in many jurisdictions, and sustained by
a substantial number of decisions,o does not seem to be in accord with the probable intention of the parties. This rule has been the object of much criticism.
In Bloch v. Busch,1 1 the Tennessee Supreme Court said, "In some jurisdictions,
based upon early rulings in the state of New York, it is held that there is no
such obligation (to actually hold the premises open) on the lessor, when his
title is good in law and the leased premises are held by a person without right.
However, the rule which we regard as the more sound is that the lessee bargains
for the possession and not merely for the chance of a law suit, and that from
the lease contract there is an implied obligation on the landlord to deliver possession or, at least, to hold the premises open to the entry of his lessee." This
language represents the attitude of those courts following the "English Rule,"
from the time of Coe v. Clay, 12 the earliest English case, down to the present
time. This is the view taken by the Missouri courts. 13
It must be borne in mind that the courts which hold that there is such an
implied covenant do not extend the period beyond the day when the lessee's term
is to begin.

If, after that time, a trespasser obtains and withholds the posses-

sion of the premises from the lessee, his remedy is against the trespasser and
not the lessor. This obvious distinction between a wrongful possession at the
time fixed for the commencement of the term, and the acts of intruders after the
lessee has taken possession under the lease, has apparently been overlooked in
14
some of the cases rejecting the "English Rule.'
In the jurisdictions which imply the covenant to so hold the premises open
on the specified day, apparently the lessee has his option whether he will bring
an action for the ejectment of the intruder or sue the lessor for damages resulting from breach of his implied covenant.

While there are no direct hold-

ings to this effect, the dicta in many of the cases indicate such option. 1 Also,
it has been held that where a lessee entered into partial possession of the leased

Ky. 570, 159 S. W. 1157 (1913); L'Hussier v. Zallee, 24 Mo. 13 (1856); Kean
v. Kolkschneider, 21 Mo. App. 538 (1886); Brown v. Wall, 186 Mo. App. 150,
171 S. W. 586 (1914); Herpolsheimer v. Christopher, 76 Neb. 352, 111 N. W.
359 (1906); Shelton v. Clinard, 187 N. C. 664, 122 S. E. 477 (1924); Block v.
Busch, 160 Tenn. 21, 22 S. W. (2d) 242 (1929); Coe v. Clay, 5 Bing. 440 (C. P.
1829); see Adrian v. Rahinowitz, 116 N. J. L. 586, 186 Atl. 29 (1926); also
Hughes v. Hood, 50 Mo. 350 (1872).
10. Note 8 supra.
11. 160 Tenn. 21, 22 S. W. (2d) 242 (1929).
12. 5 Bing. 440 (C. P. 1829).
13. L'Hussier v. Zallee, 24 Mo. 13 (1856); Kean v. Kolkschneider, 21 Mo.
App. 538 (1886); Brown v. Wall, 186 Mo. App. 150, 171 S. W. 586 (1914).
14. See Snider v. Deban, 249 Mass. 59, 144 N. E. 69 (1924). See also 16
R. C. L. 724 et seq.
15. See the cases in note 9 supra.
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premises, knowing the other part was occupied by a third person, the payment of
16
the entire rent by the lessee constituted a waiver of the implied covenant.
Assuming a situation where the lessee can recover damages arising from the
17
breach of the implied covenant to give possession, what is the measure of
damages? The ordinary measure of damages for the lessee's exclusion from
possession is the difference between the actual rental value of the premises and
the rent reserved. 18 Thus, if there is no such excess, it seems that nominal damages only could be recovered.' 9 Besides these "general" damages, the lessee may,
according to the weight of authority, recover such "special" damages as result
20
However, in order
directly from the lessor's breach of the implied covenant.
and proved.
alleged
be
properly
must
to recover such "special" damages, they
from the
recover
lessee
should
the
that
logical
and
It is both reasonable
in
though
possession,
to
give
failure
lessor all expenses arising from the lessor's
and
prehome
a Missouri case the lessee's expense of breaking up his former
2
paring to take over the leased premises was denied him. '
The earlier decisions, in both England and this country, indicate that profits were excluded as an element of damages recoverable. However, this rule
has been generally abandoned and the right to recover profits is usually determined by the same rules that govern the recovery of other damages. Loss of profits
is therefore a proper element of damages, when such loss is the direct and necessary result of the defendant's act, or when such loss may reasonably have been
within the contemplation of the parties when the contract was made, as a probable result of its breach, and where the profits can be determined with reasonable certainty. 22 However, many decisions have denied such recovery for the
reason that if the business of the lessee is not an established one, the loss of profit
23
is conjectural.

16. Rieger v. Welles, 110 Mo. App. 166, 84 S. W. 1136 (1903).
17. As to measure of damages where there is a breach of covenant for quiet
enjoyment, see Note (1929) 62 A. L. R. 1311.
18. Huyler's v. Ritz-Carlton Restaurant & Hotel Co., 6 F. (2d) 404 (D. Del.
1925); King v. Reynolds, 67 Ala. 229 (1880); Nunnally Co. v. Bromberg & Co.,
217 Ala. 180, 115 So. 230 (1928); Thomas v. Croom,.102 Ark. 108, 143 S. W.
88 (1912); Shoemaker v. Crawford, 82 Mo. App. 487 (1900); Orlando v. Brown,
296 S. W. 245 (Mo. App. 1927); Herpolsheimer v. Christopher, 76 Neb. 352, 111
N. W. 359 (1906); Jarman v. Sexton, 264 N. W. 305 (Neb. 1936); Adrian v.
Rabinowitz, 116 N. J. L. 586, 186 Atl. 29 (1936); Burkhard v. Morris, 206 App.
Div. 366, 201 N. Y. Supp. 225 (4th Dep't 1923); Sloan v. Hart, 150 N. C. 269,
63 S. E. 1037 (1909); Dills v. Calloway, 52 P. (2d) 707 (Okla. 1935), See
Hughes v. Hood, 50 Mo. 350 (1872). There is no breach of implied covenant to
give possession when there is merely a contract to give a lease. See St. Louis
Brewing Ass'n v. Niederluecke, 102 Mo. App. 303, 76 S. W. 645 (1903).
19. Rose v. Wynn, 42 Ark. 257 (1883); Phillips v. Bossung, 108 Neb. 658,
189 N. W. 172 (1922).
20. See the cases in Note (1936) 104 A. L. R. 149.
21. Hughes v. Hood, 50 Mo. 350 (1872). See Orlando v. Brown, 296 S. W.
245 (Mo. App. 1927).
22. 8 R. C. L. 501.
23. Leslie E. Brooks Co. v. Long, 67 Fla. 68, 64 So. 452 (1914); Alexander
v. Bishop, 59 Iowa 572, 13 N. W. 714 (1882); Jarrait v. Peters, 145 Mich. 29,
108 N. W. 432 (1906); Walter Box Co. v. Blackburn, 157 S. W. 220 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1913).
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But these same facts may give the lessee a defense to the lessor's claim
for rent. Where the lessee is unable to obtain possession because of the fact that
one having paramount title is in possession, he has a good defense to the lessor's claim for rent.24 This is true even though the exclusion extends to only a
part of the leased premises.25 However, where the lessee takes possession of
the part from which he is not excluded, he is liable to an action for use and oc26
cupation of such part.

Where there is partial exclusion by a paramount owner,

so far as it affects his liability for the rent, it seems that the analogy of partial
eviction has been applied so as to permit an apportionment of the rent.27
Where the lessee has been excluded by a stranger without right there is a
conflict of authority as to whether such exclusion is a good defense to a claim
for rent. Probably in the majority of jurisdictions this is no defense, 28 unless
there is a specific provision in the lease. In some jurisdictions, including
Missouri, it is held that, since the lessee has a right of action for damages in
29
such case, the exclusion would be an absolute bar to a claim for rent.
When the lessee is prevented from taking possession by the lessor himself,
the analogy of eviction by the landlord is applied and the courts are quite agreed
that the lessee has a defense when sued for the rent.30 The fact that part of
the premises are open makes no difference, because he is not bound to take part
when he has bargained for the whole. 3 '
There is some authority to the effect that, even though the lessee takes
possession of part, he is, if excluded from part, not liable for rent or for the use
and occupation of the premises.3 2 This result could be reached by an analogy
3
to partial eviction by the lessor. But there is some authority to the contrary.8
It may be, however, where the lessee takes and retains possession of part, that
he has "waived" his right to the remainder and may be held liable for the entire
rent.34 This is putting the penalty of the lessor's wrong on the lessee, and seems
to be an improper application of the theory of "waiver."
In the ordinary situation it would seem, when the lessor and lessee enter

24. Brandt v. Phillippi, 82 Cal. 640, 23 Pac. 122 (1890); Andrews v. Woodcock, 14 Iowa 397 (1862). See Mechanics' & Traders' Fire Ins. Co. v. Scott, 2
Hilt. 550 (N. Y. 1859).
25. Dengler v. Michelssen, 76 Cal. 125, 18 Pac. 138 (1888); Lawrence v.
French, 25 Wend. 443, 7 Hill 519 (N. Y. 1844).
26. Tunis v. Grandy, 22 Grat. 109 (Va. 1872). See Lawrence v. French,
25 Wend. 443, 7 Hill 519 (N. Y. 1844).
27. Seabrook v. Moyer, 88 Pa. 417 (1879).
28. Ward v. Edesheimer, 43 N. Y. St. Rep. 138, 17 N. Y. Supp. 173 (1892);
University of Vermont v. Joslyn, 21 Vt. 52 (1848).
29. Kean v. Kolkschneider, 21 Mo. App. 538 (1886); it is assumed in
Rieger v. Welles, 110 Mo. App. 166, 84 S. W. 1136 (1903).
30. Penny v. F ellner, 6 Okla. 386, 50 Pac. 123 (1897); McClurg v. Price,
59 Pa. 420 (1868).
31. O'Brien v. Smith, 37 N. Y. St. Rep. 43, 13 N. Y. Supp. 408 (1891),
aff'd without opinion, 129 N. Y. 620, 29 N. E. 1029 (1891).
32. Moore v. Mansfield, 182 Mass. 302, 65 N. E. 398 (1902); McClurg v.
Price, 59 Pa. 420 (1868).
33. Eldred v. Leahy, 31 Wis. 546 (1872).
34. Prior v. Kiso, 81 Mo. 241 (1883).
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into a lease, that it is the intention of the parties that the lessor is to have the
premises open, both legally and actually, to the entry of the lessee, on the day
set for the beginning of the term. Where there is a failure in this respect, for
adequate protection to the lessee, he has not only a defense to a claim for rent
but his affirmation action to recover damages for breach of the implied covenant.
DAviD R. HARDY.

THE RIGHT OF THE STATE TO APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASES

For sometime there has been an open admission by the bar and the general
public that our criminal law administration as it exists today is greatly in need
of change. Fxom time to time various methods of reform have been urged.
Prominent among them is the suggestion that the state be allowed the same
right of appeal as has the defendant. Much has been written upon this subject,
and the recommendation has gained such recognition and support that it merits
serious consideration by everyone. In dealing with such a suggestion it must
be remembered that the federal and state constitutions must not be violated,
and that justice must be furthered and not hampered. The latter involves most
of all a consideration of the practical factors that exist in our criminal procedure
today, for it is upon them that the ultimate justification for or against such a
right of appeal in the state must lie.
Although neither the state nor the defendant has any common law right to
appeal, yet by statutes the defendant has in all jurisdictions, save two, been given
a broader right to appeal than has the state.' This, in itself, might seem to
be strongly indicative of the lack of merit involved in such a right by the state,
but if the question is approached historically such a contention loses much, if
not all, of its force.
Prior to 1700 neither the defendant nor the crown had a right to a writ
of error or appeal. The defendant as a matter of the grace of the king was
often granted a writ of error.2 Soon thereafter the writ of error came to be
regarded not merely as a matter of grace to the defendant but of right whenever there was probable error.3 This writ was supplanted in 1907 by the Eng-

1.

ADMINISTRATION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (Am. L. Inst. 1935) 112-113.

Connecticut by statute (Gen. Stat. (1930) § 6494) allows the state to appeal as
it does the defendant. See also United States v. Sanges, 144 U. S. 310 (1892) ;
People v. Bork, 78 N. Y. 346 (1879); Miller, Appeals by the State in Criminal
Cases (1927) 36 YALE L. J. 486; Orfield, Appeal by the State in Criminal Cases
(1935) 15 ORE. L. REV. 306. For the argument that there may be a general statutory right of appeal, see Johnson, The Right of the State to Sue Out a Writ of
Error in Criminal Cases (1933)

11 CHICAGO-KENT REV. 85.

2. In Rex v. Wilkes, 4 Burr. 2527, 2550 (K. B. 1770) Lord Mansfield said,
"Till the 3d of Queen Anne, a writ of error in any criminal case was held to be
merely ex gratia. .

.

. It

never was granted, except when the King, from

justice, where there really was error, or from favour, though there was no
error, was willing the outlawry should be reversed."
3. Miller, supra note 1, at 490.
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lish Criminal Appeal Act,* extending appeals to cover situations falling here5
tofore under the scope of the writs of error.
Thus, when our states were first formed, it was generally assumed that
England had developed no general right of appeal for the state in criminal
Nor did the American states develop such a right. One might well wonder why. Before he ascended to the bench the now Judge Justin Miller explains
it upon the ground that this period happened to be coincident with a period of
juristic thought which began to emphasize the liberties or privileges of man and
cases.

subordinated the powers of government; a time when defendants were placed
at tremendous disadvantage in criminal proceedings in that they appeared
without counsel, without witnesses, or the right to be sworn in their own behalf; a time of great political oppression by the prosecution against those unfortunate enough to be brought into a criminal court. Because of these and
other disadvantages of the accused there was a reaction in his favor. And it
is Judge Miller's belief that the general development of rules of procedure was
premised upon this reaction and was designed to equalize the position of the
6
defendant and the state.
7
If this is so, and the ablest of writers substantiate Judge Miller's position,

the question is open as to whether or not under present day conditions these rules
premised upon the former oppression of the criminally-accused are still sound,
or whether they are obsolete and are a hampering force in our criminal law
administration.

8

This invites a study of the position of the criminal today with

special reference to the relative power the state has and assumes in criminal
prosecutions. If the accused is no longer in need of this equalizing factor, and
if society will be benefited in the obtaining of an improved criminal procedure
by giving the state a broad right of appeal then a change should be made.
One of the foremost proponents for an equal power in the defendant and
the state to appeal is Judge Miller, who points out, among other reasons, that
the success of the administration of criminal law as a protective agency is
measured largely in terms of the apprehension and conviction of guilty persons,
and that to refuse to the state the right of appeal from errors in the trial tempts
and often results in intended misconduct on the part of the defense attorney,"

4. 7 Edw. VII, c. 23, § 3 (1907).
5. Orfield, History of Criminal AppeaZ In England (1936) 1 Mo. L. REV.
326; Miller, supra note 1, at 490.
5a. United States v. Sanges, 144 U. S. 310 (1892).
6. Miller, loc. cit. supra note 1.
7. STEPHEN, GENERAL ViEw oF THE CRIMINAL LAw (2d ed. 1890) 171; 1
STrEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW Or ENGLAND (1883) 415; 1 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) 994.
8. Orfield, supra note 1: "A proposal frequently reiterated in almost every
comprehensive statement of the reform of criminal appellate procedure is that
the state be given the right to appeal. There is an overwhelming unanimity of
opinion to that effect." See also, Bostick, Proposed Reforms in CriminalProcedure
(1920) 11 J. CRiM.L. 216, 219; THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE CODE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE (1930) § 423.
9. Miller, supra note 1, at 509: "He (the prosecuting attorney) knows that
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as well as causing the trial judge to lean toward the defense in all rulings of
law.' 0 The trial judge knows that the state cannot appeal even if the court
unduly prejudices the state's case. He knows that if he rules against the defendant the conviction is subject to reversal and he, the trial judge, to the
possibility of censure from the appellate tribunal. Furthermore, there is serious hindrance of a proper development of both substantive and procedural
criminal law. We find an anomalous situation in that the supreme court is the
final adjudicator of constitutional questions of a civil nature, yet our trial courts
decide the constitutionality of all questions of criminal law from which the defendant does not appeal. The result of this is that sometimes the same criminal
statute is found to be unconstitutional in one district of the state and constitutional in some other part of the state. 1 Also, to refuse appellate review in matters of errors in law is to free many criminals who escape conviction through
incorrect rulings in the trial court. All of this can but tend to demoralize our
criminal law system. On the other side of the controversy is the hardship which
would be imposed upon the defendant if the state were permitted the general
right to appeal. Many defendants are too poor to hire an attorney to take an
appeal. The argument is made that it is truly an anomalous state of affairs
if the state may subject a poverty-stricken defendant to a reconsideration of
his case because of the faulty operation of its own judicial machinery, even
though he, the defendant, has in no way been at fault.12 This is an argument
of considerable weight, yet it should be viewed in the light of the above faults of
the present system with the further consideration that defendants in civil cases
are subject to this hardship and without any serious question, and that society

his sardonic opponent across the room, violating with impunity practically every
rule of practice, and goading him deliberately into error, holds a whip hand
against which it is almost impossible for him to compete. He knows that a record
is being made of his words and actions upon which he may be later taken to
task, but that he can make no record of the words or actions of the attorney for
the defense which will serve any purpose." See also, Ferrari, The Public Defender (1917) 2 J. CRIM. L. 704.
10. Miller, supra note 1, at 511: "The result is, further, that trial judges
become more and more subject to local influence and local pressure in favor of
the defendant. Few persons are interested in urging the trial judge to stand
up squarely for law enforcement. Practically every defendant, on the other
hand, has friends in the church, in the lodge, in the union, or in the social group
who make it their business to whisper their suggestions and intimations in favor
of leniency. The weak, spineless trial judge is able to hide his weakness in a
record upon which the state has no appeal and thus to do the bidding of his
friends. The strong, fearless judge acquires the reputation of being "hard-boiled"
of '"railroading men to jail." If he rules on a disputed point in favor of the
state and is reversed, he is punished from day to day by covert innuendoes and
at election time by direct attack."
11. Commonwealth v. Cummings, 3 Cush. 212, 213 (Mass. 1849): "A worse
uncertainty of the law can hardly be conceived, than where the legislative acts
of a government, by which all persons within its limits ought to be equally bound
and protected, should receive a different final construction, in different judicial
tribunals, and thus have a different operation upon those who are alike subject
to them."
12. Orfield, supra note 1, at 311. There, also, is made the suggestion that
the state pay the appeal-fees of poor defendants.
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is exposed to grave danger by freeing without a fair trial men that are under
serious suspicion of being criminals.
Although most of the controversy of late has been over this question of
whether or not the state should have a full right of appeal as does the defendant, several other possibilities of reform have been presented. One possibility
suggested is that in order to obtain the ruling of law on those questions which
the state wishes to appeal, the state should be allowed the right to appeal, but
the appellate court's decision should not affect the defendant in the case but
should be used for future guidance only. Such a suggestion is impractical and
carries with it more evil than assistance.' 3 We have long recognized that our
legal system is founded upon an equilibrium of the various interests concerned,
such equilibrium being found by recognizing and estimating the respective forces
of these interests and giving effect to the more important of them as judged
by our social scale. 14 The result of the moot appeal would be that the various
conflicting interests would not be represented properly before the court, as the
defendant would not have a sufficient interest to cause him to pay a competent
attorney to represent his view. Only in rare instances would amicus curia appear, for other than the prosecuting attorney few have a real interest in such
questions as a criminal case would present. It is in this that the moot criminal
appeals differ from ordinary declaratory judgment proceedings.' 5 Thus, although it is well known that our appellate judges lean most heavily, in these
days of crowded dockets, upon the counsel for a proper presentation of the issues
before them, such a presentation would be lacking. The practical effect of the
trial court discharging the defendant only to be reversed upon the law in the
case would be that people indicted for crime would be free to mingle among
society without society having been assured that they were released only after
a fair trial. Further, the defendant in such a situation would still carry in the
eyes of the public the stigma attributed to a criminal, for society would know
that the appellate court had declared the proceedings at the trial to be contrary
to law. Then, too, it is admitted that the deciding of a moot criminal case is
not a proper judicial function. It certainly assumes a legislative function, for
the moot decision merely lays down a rule for the regulation of future conduct.' 6

13. Orfield, supra note 1, at 313: "The defects of this type of appeal are so
obvious as to have attracted more comment than all other types of appeal by the
state except appeal from acquittal."
14. Hicks, Moot Appeals by the State in Criminal Cases (1928) 7 ORE. L.
REv. 218, 221.
15. See id. at 219. Muskrat v. United States, 219 U. S. 346 (1911). 1
WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED SfrAT
HISTORY (1922) 109. For
the general discussion of declaratory judgments, see Borchard, The Declaratory
Judgment-A Needed ProceduralReform (1918) 28 YALE L. J.105.
16. 1 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (8th ed. 1927) 183. United
States v. Evans, 213 U. S.297, 301 (1909) : "It was long ago held by this court
that the discharge of such a function was not an exercise of judicial power."
Mills v. Green, 159 U. S. 651 (1895); Hammer v. Smith, 11 Ariz. 420, 94 Pac.
1121 (1908); State v. Le Clair, 86 Me. 522, 30 Atl. 7 (1894); State v. Kelsev,
49 N. D. 148, 190 N. W. 817 (1922), wherein the Supreme Court of North
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Even those who contend for a full right of appeal in the state and thus
avoid the problems involved in moot decisions are confronted with a denial of
the constitutionality of such a right of appeal on the constitutional ground of
double jeopardy. The various states' constitutions read differently on this
matter. In seven states we find the constitutional provision to be that no person "after an acquittal" may be tried again for the same offense.. 7 In one state
the provision is that no person shall "after conviction or acquittal" of an offense be again prosecuted for the same offense. 18 In all of the other state constitutions that have a double jeopardy clause and in the federal constitution,
the provision is that "no person shall twice be put in jeopardy . . ." for the same

offense.19 In five states (Massachusetts, Connecticut, Maryland, North Carolina,
20
and Vermont) there is no constitutional provision against double jeopardy.
Yet where the defendant has been acquitted by the jury there are only two
states (Connecticut and Vermont) that give to the prosecution the right by
21
statute to appeal with the consent of the trial court to obtain a new trial.
Some of the courts that forbid this right do so on the constitutional grounds of

Dakota held a statute providing for such appeals to be unconstitutional on the
ground that it was an attempt to vest the court with legislative power. See
also, Loring v. Young, 239 Mass. 349, 132 N. E. 65 (1921), wherein the Massachusetts Supreme Court refused to even consider a prior advisory opinion on
the same point of law now before the court in an actual case. See, Grinnell,
The Constitutional History of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
(1917) 2 MASS. L. Q. 383, 542.
17. Mo. CONST. art II, § 23; ADMINISTRATION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (Am.
L. Inst. 1935) 7; People ex rel. Robison v. Swift, 59 Mich. 529 (1886); State v.
Spear, 6 Mo. 644 (1840); State v. Lee, 10 R. I. 494 (1873); State v. Burris, 3
Tex. 118 (1848). State v. Linton, 283 Mo. 1, 222 S. W. 847 (1920), held that
while the constitution does not forbid a person from being twice tried after the
jury has been sworn, the common law of the state forbids this. State v. Buente,
256 Mo. 227, 165 S. W. 340 (1914), upheld a statute authorizing a justice to discharge a man after a jury had been impaneled on trial for a lesser offense and
hold him for a felony based on the same act. The court held that such a statute
changed the common law as to that offense. Cf. Mo. REv. SfrAT. (1929) § 4007:
"In all criminal cases, where the defendant is charged with any offense against
the laws of this state, the fact of the former acquittal or conviction of such offense may be shown under the general issue or plea of not guilty." Notice the
exceptions under the Missouri constitution, article II, Section 23; "... . but if the
jury . . . fail to render a verdict, the court . . . may, in its discretion, discharge the jury and commit or bail the prisoner for trial at the next term of
court . . . ." ". . . if judgment be arrested after a verdict of guilty on a
defective indictment" a new trial may be had. Ibid. ". . . if judgment on a

verdict of guilty be reversed for error in law, nothing herein contained shall
prevent a new trial of the prisoner on a proper indictment, or according to correct principles of law." Ibid.
18. ADMINISTRATION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (Am. L. Inst. 1935) 7.
19. ADMINISTRATION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (Am. L. Inst. 1935) 7. See
discussion by Orfield, supra note 1; (1936) 27 J. CRiM. L. 917.
20. ADMINISTRATION OF THU CRIMINAL LAW (Am. L. Inst. 1935) 7.
21. ADMINISTRATION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (Am. L. Inst. 1935) 7; Palko
v. Connecticut, 58 Sup. Ct. 149 (1937); State v. Lee, 65 Conn. 265 (1894);
State v. Felch, 92 Vt. 477, 105 AtI. 23 (1918). The granting of an appeal of
the state only in the discretion of the trial court is protected against the prosecutor's hounding a defendant.
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double jeopardy. 22 Others have put it simply on the ground that there was no
statute in the particular state allowing such a thing to be done and that it
could not be done at common law. 23 As to when one is considered to be in jeopardy the American Law Institute in 1935 said: "It seems most likely that the
framers of the constitutions that contain the phrase 'twice in jeopardy' used it
with its common law meaning, viz., after conviction or acquittal. The courts,
however, have given it a much broader meaning, and have held that a person
is 'in jeopardy' as soon as a jury has been impaneled, or been sworn, or been
'charged' with the prisoner, and that after that the defendant cannot be tried
again. Of course, the courts have introduced exceptions to the rule; the practical administration of the law required it and hence the rule has come to be
that the prisoner may be tried a second time though he has been 'in jeopardy'
on the swearing of the jury, if 'necessity' requires a discharge of the jury,
though . . . the constitution makes no exception of necessity. 'Necessity'
now covers a number of different matters including the inability of the jury to
agree. It is not clear why the courts selected the swearing of the jury as the
point in the proceedings at which the defendant came in jeopardy rather that
at arraignment, or plea, or even at the finding of an indictment. It would seem
to be more reasonable to hold that he was not in jeopardy until the evidence had
shown a prima facie case against him, for there would be no danger of conviction until that point. The apparent reason is what seems to have been a confusion of thought which linked up the idea of 'double jeopardy' with a rule enunciated by Lord Coke that the jury should be kept together until they returned
their verdict. This rule is denied by writers both before and after Coke-and
even Coke does not say what would be the effect if the rule were disregarded." 24
A further constitutional difficulty was removed by a recent United States
Supreme Court decision holding that a statute giving the state a full right of
appeal in criminal cases is not unconstitutional as being against the due proc-

22. ADMINISTRATION OF THE CRIMINAL LAw (Am. L. Inst. 1935) 111; State
v. Hand, 6 Ark. 169 (1845); People v. Webb, 38 Cal. 467 (1869); People v.
Royal, 1 Scam. 557 (Ill.
1839); Commonwealth v. Ball, 126 Ky. 542, 104 S. W.
325 (1907); State v. Anderson, 3 Smedes & M. 751 (Miss. 1844); State v. Spear,
6 Mo. 644 (1840) ; State v. Hubbell, 18 Wash. 482, 51 Pac. 1039 (1898) ; Ex parts
Bornee, 76 W. Va. 360, 85 S. E. 529 (1915).
23. United States v. Sanges, 144 U. S. 310 (1892); State v. Newkirk, 80
Ind. 131 (1881) ; State v. Johnson, 2 Clarke 549 (Iowa 1856) ; State v. Shields,
49 Md. 301 (1878).
24. ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL LAW (Am. L. Inst. 1935) 8. See also,
State v. Lee, 65 Conn. 265, 272 (1894): "The end is not reached, the cause
is not finished, until both the facts and the law applicable to the facts are
finally determined. The principle of finality is essential; but not more essential
than the principle of justice." See (1926) 30 L. N. 2, to the effect that a constitutional provision against putting a prisoner twice in jeopardy forbids the
granting of an appeal by the state from an acquittal where the effect of the reversal would be to allow a retrial of the case. See also (1926) 27 J. CRIM. L.
917.
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ess clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, nor in derogation of the privileges
25
and immunities clause of the Federal Constitution.
The Federal government by the Criminal Appeal Act 26 has been permitted
the right to appeal from a decision to quash, set aside or sustain a demurrer to
any indictment . . . based upon the invalidity or construction of any statute
upon which the indictment is founded, from an arrest of judgment of conviction for insufficiency of the indictment where validity or construction of the
statute is in issue, and from a decision sustaining a special plea in bar when the
defendant is not put in jeopardy. In Missouri the state's right to appeal extends only to appealing from sustained demurrers or exceptions to allegedly insufficient indictments or informations, or where judgments thereon are arrested
or set aside for such insufficiencies-such appeal being in the court's discretion.27
Thus there is a great variance in the scope of the right of a state to appeal in criminal cases from Connecticut and Vermont who give the full right of
appeal (there being no constitutional provision against double jeopardy in those
states) to those extreme states that give no right of appeal, with the "in-between" states with varying scopes, to the Federal government who gives a comparatively broad right of appeal to the government. It would seem that it is
well worth while to reconsider this phase of criminal procedure with a view
toward improving the system. Especially is this true under the obvious miscarriage of justice under the present system whose historical basis now seems
obsolete.28 The American Law Institute in 1935 took this question under advisement and adopted the resolution that, "Where a person has been acquitted
generally, and in the course of the trial a material error has been made to the
prejudice of the State the State shall be entitled to a new trial."29 This resolution is not meant to represent the holdings of those jurisdictions that have
double jeopardy clauses, nor does it seem to represent that class of state that
has no statutory right to appeal. Yet it does show the attitude of that body upon this question. In view of the fact that the criminal class today is still rampant and is often so well protected by able counsel and judicial tolerance,
it would seem desirable that Missouri adopt as a part of its criminal procedure
the above quoted resolution of the American Law Institute. To do this would
necessitate an amendment of Section 23 of article II of the Missouri constitution. That section specifically provides that no person shall "after being once
acquitted by a jury, be again, for the same offense, put in jeopardy of life or

25. Palko v. Connecticut, 58 Sup. Ct. 149 (1937), aff'g 122 Conn. 529, 191
Atl. 320 (1937).
26. 36 STAT. 1246 (1907), 18 U. S. C. 862 (1927).
27. MO. Rzv. STAT. (1929) § 3753. S'ee also, Mo. REV. STAT. (1929) § 3775.
28. State v. Adams, 142 Ark. 411, 218 S. W. 845 (1920) ; State v. Spahr, 186
Ind. 589, 117 N. E. 648 (1917) ; Commonwealth v. Prall, 146 Ky. 109, 142 S. W.
202 (1912); Commonwealth v. Gritten, 180 Ky. 446, 202 S. W. 884 (1918);
State v. Harrison, 154 La. 1011, 98 So. 622 (1923). See also (1937) 27 J. CRIM.
L. 917.
29. ADMINISTRATION OF THE CRIMINATL LAW (Am. L. Inst. 1935) § 13.
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liberty..
." Even if the state would secure a reversal on appeal the state
would not be able to retry the defendant again under this section, and thus to
grant any appeal without amending the section of the Missouri constitution would
be to grant a moot appeal, whose evils and limitations have been discussed earlier in this article. To protect the defendant from unwarranted harassing by
prosecutors who would act under this broadened right of the state to appeal,
the appeal by the state can be limited to being granted only in the discretion
of the trial judge. Missouri has so limited it in her present appeal statute as
have many other states.
ELMO HUNT.
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